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6.1. Introduction
At the end of the Second World War, American occupying forces
denounced theGerman traditionof cartelizationand its contribution to
the building up of Nazi power. While Germanywas far from being the
onlyEuropeancountrywitha traditionof cartelization, itwasprobably
the country where the systematic organization of markets had gone
furthest by the mid-1940s. Fifty years later, cartels have been all but
formally outlawed from the German economy through, in particular,
the double effect of a national anti-cartel act and of European competi-
tion law. At ﬁrst sight, this suggests that, over a period of ﬁfty years or
so, theGerman regimegoverning competition has been radically reori-
ented. It has moved away from a deepmistrust of market competition
(deﬁned here as opposed to any form of collusion between compet-
itors) and a marked preference for systematic inter-ﬁrm cooperation
towards an overall endorsement of the liberal competition principle
and a negative perception of cartelization.
A path dependency argument could see the mark here of one of
those rare but critical junctures, where an institutional system or sub-
system enters a radically new path, usually as a result of pressures
external to the system itself. However, an analysis of the trans-
formation of the German competition regime shows the limits of
conventional path dependency approaches in trying to account for
such an episode of institutional change. The end of Nazi Germany and
In alphabetical order. We thank the editors of this volume for highly helpful comments and
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theOccupationperiodwere indeedcritical junctures—butwith respect
to the competition regime, they did not ‘set into motion institutional
patterns or event chains (with) deterministic properties’ (Mahoney
2000: 507). Rather they marked the starting point of an ad hoc clear-
ing process that would generate a crooked path. We follow that path,
step by step, to propose an alternative theoretical frame to approach
institutional change—what we call here path generation.
We look at the fate of the German competition regime by compar-
ing what happened in product markets, on the one hand, and in the
banking sector, on the other. The comparison of those two cases is
interesting because, in spite of quite similar starting conditions, out-
comes were different. This type of comparison has the potential—as
we try to show in the last part of the chapter—to generate theoretical
insights on institutional change in general. In both cases, the initial
impulse for regime changewas exogenous—the initiative coming from
the Allied occupation government. This initial impulse was, in both
cases, an attempt to increase competition where cooperation had been
the dominant principle governing inter-ﬁrm relations. Struggles and
confrontation evolved over a period of nearly ten years. Muddling
through, give and take, negotiations, small steps forward followed by
moments of backlash characterized the paths in both cases. In the end,
in the case of product markets, the crooked path ultimately led to a
signiﬁcant transformationof formal institutions—away fromcarteliza-
tionand towardsoligopolistic competition.With respect to thebanking
sector, however, drastic formal changes, originally introduced by the
Allied occupation government, did not prove stable and disappeared.
This chapter has threemain parts. First, we tell the story of the trans-
formation of the competition regime in German product markets. We
turn next to describe what happened in the German banking sector.
A comparison of developments in those two cases illustrates and
reveals the limits of conventional path dependency accounts. Finally,
in the discussion section, we draw from this comparison a number of
theoretical insights about institutional development and change.
6.2. Transforming the Competition Regime in
German Product Markets
We ﬁrst consider the reordering of product markets in Germany after
the SecondWorldWar as an illustration of a process of path generation.
This case is interesting because it reveals a tension between change and
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persistence, between a break with the historically dominant legacy
of cartelization and the persistence of coordinated market behaviour,
albeit in different forms—through mergers, for example, or through
bank shareholding in ﬁrms. It also reveals the importance of foreign
inﬂuences.
6.2.1. The legacy of the past: organized capitalism in
inter-war Germany
WhenHilferding 1923wrote about ‘organized capitalism’ inGermany,
he referred to a complex system of institutional mechanisms allowing
German companies to control and stabilize their markets to a signi-
ﬁcant extent. The most important of such mechanisms were cartels,
combines and the bank–industry nexus (see also Sorge, Chapter 5,
this volume)—all of which had their origins in the last decades of
the nineteenth century but had come into existence for different
reasons.
A severe but relatively short slump following the industrial boom
of the 1870s provided the impetus for the emergence of the ﬁrst cartels
as ‘voluntary agreements between independent enterprises of a sim-
ilar type to secure a monopoly of the market’ (Liefmann 1938: 7).
The cartelization movement, however, lasted well beyond this period,
increasing in scale and scope in buoyant times as much as in more dif-
ﬁcult ones (Djelic 1998: 54–5). The scope and stability of these cartels
naturally differed considerably between sectors. Basic industries and
raw materials were regulated by a few strongly organized and stable
cartels. In the ﬁnished goods industries, on the other hand, cartels
tended to involve larger numbers of ﬁrms and they usually proved
more fragile. The collapse of a particular cartel agreement in those
industries was usually followed by a period of cut-throat competition
that itself triggered the crystallization of new cartel agreements.
From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, the development
of horizontal cartels on a large scale was complemented by the emer-
gence of ownership-based links between ﬁrms known as Konzerne.
Liefman (1938: 225) deﬁnes the Konzerne as ‘a merger of ﬁrms that
remain juridically independent of one another into a single unit for the
purposes of productive technique, administration, trading or (espe-
cially) ﬁnance’. A key difference between cartels and Konzerne was
that whereas cartels were on the whole horizontal associations aiming
to limit and control competition between ﬁrms operating in similar
product markets, Konzerne had often a vertical dimension or would
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even bring together ﬁrms from unrelated industries to which ﬁnan-
cial and banking partners could be added. According to Kocka and
Siegrist (1979: 91–4) the ﬁrst Konzerne were created in order to over-
come bottle-necks in the supply chain and to counterbalance deﬁcits
in the technical and ﬁnancial infrastructure of Germany at that time.
The economic disruptions following the First World War were fer-
tile ground for the multiplication of such combines. By 1927, the top
one hundred corporations in Germany were practically all Konzerne
(Siegrist 1980: 87–8 as mentioned in Herrigel 1996: 95).
The bank–company nexus similarly increased in importance from
the last quarter of the nineteenth century and changed its nature and
formsigniﬁcantly. Up to theendof thenineteenthcentury, largeprivate
banks acted predominantly as commercial banks (Quack 2004) and
sought to limit their lending risk by encouraging companies to obtain
long-term ﬁnance on capital markets. Banks would hold a portion of
the securities they underwrote but these holdings were generally seen
as temporary, waiting for buyers that could offer a reasonable price.
At that time, banks would only rarely transform frozen credit into
shareholdings (Edwards and Olgivie 1996; Vitols 2001: 8).
Links between banks and companies became much tighter with
the economic crises of 1923–4 and 1929–33. German banks increas-
ingly turned to transforming frozen credits into long-term industrial
shareholdings as a way to save and stabilize companies that had run
into trouble (Höpner and Krempel 2003). At the end of the Weimar
Republic, German banks had gained a central position as mainsprings
of national industrial policy. This position reﬂected the multiplicity
of their roles as ‘supervisory board members, creditors, share own-
ers, organizers of consortiums, and executors of the voting rights of
dispersed share owners’ (Höpner and Krempel 2003: 8). The combin-
ation of these roles made German banks important intermediaries in
the market for corporate control. But German banks were not only
owners and providers of capital. For many German ﬁrms, they were
also a source of stability and a buffer against competition and its con-
sequences. This stabilitywas reinforced by the long-standing tradition
within the German banking sector of regulating competition through
gentlemen’s agreements. Initiatedbyprofessional associations, a num-
ber of these agreements or cartels were in time to bemade compulsory
by the state.
By the end of the 1930s, cartels and combines had prolifer-
ated and the links between banks and industrial companies had
become extremely dense. Faced with recurrent economic crisis,
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German politicians, lawyers, and economists had come increasingly
to regard competition as potentially disruptive to the social order.
They welcomed ‘organized capitalism’ as progress. While criticisms
of cartels and their impact during the hyperinﬂation of 1923 led
to a decree against abuses of cartels, this did not change the gen-
erally positive attitude in Germany to cartelization as a form of
market coordination. Towards the end of theWeimar Republic, cartels
increasingly became state regulated. Particularly during the Great
Depression, theGermangovernment started to use compulsory cartels
as a means of stabilizing industries facing crises—the banking sec-
tor being there an interesting illustration. Faced with the banking
crisis of 1931, the Weimar government authorized the banking asso-
ciations to set up a compulsory cartel on debit and credit interest
rates.
During theNaziperiod, a lawon the formationof compulsorycartels
waspromulgatedon15 July1933, becoming thebasis forgovernmental
intervention and state-led economic planning until the Second World
War. Under the rigid centralized control put in place during the war,
cartelswere oftennot in theposition topursue andachieve their object-
ives. Voigt (1962: 187) states that at the end of the war the total number
of cartels had declined to 650 ‘a large number of which were nothing
more than mere shells’. Many of these shells, however, would become
quickly revitalized, particularly in those industries that had been pre-
viously strongly cartelized.Attitudes towards the legitimacy of cartels
as a means of economic coordination would prove deeply entrenched
in a whole generation of business leaders that was soon to resume
responsibility after the end of the war.
6.2.2. The long post-war struggle for a German
competition law
Awidely shared conviction that cartels and large combines had played
an important role in the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany led the
military governments at the PotsdamConference to agree thatGerman
industry should be decartelized and deconcentrated after the war.
Allied anti-cartel laws issued in 1947 prohibited cartels, combines,
syndicates, or trusts (Damm 1958). On the American side, they grew
out of the long-standing American antitrust tradition and reﬂected
signiﬁcant concerns about the role played by international cartels in
undermining and even harming US security and defence before and
during the Second World War (Berghahn 1986: 85; Djelic 1998: 82–3).
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The British and French military governments followed the US policy
of forbidding cartels as a means of destroying German war capa-
city. Their attitude towards cartel agreements—that were also com-
mon practice in Britain or France—was nevertheless much more
lenient.
In 1949, the occupation statute was signed and Germany was
allowed to return progressively to sovereignty. TheAmerican govern-
ment insisted, however, that certainﬁelds, among themdecartelization
and ﬁnancial decentralization, would remain under the full control
and scrutiny of the newly created Allied High Commission that took
over at the end of the period of military government (Horstmann
1991: 192). In the treaty allowing Germany to return progressively
to sovereignty, the American government demanded that German
agencies prepare and submit their own competition law. This law,
however, would replace the 1947 Allied legislation only after being
fully validated and accepted by Allied authorities. The United States,
and to a certain degree the United Kingdom, were thus in a posi-
tion to exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence onWest German legislation, through
political and economic coercion, including after the foundation of the
Federal Republic of Germany in September 1949. This remained the
case at least until the end of the occupation regime in 1954 (Djelic
1998: 81).
American policy makers were aware that radical transformations of
the sort they were fostering would survive only if Germans actively
appropriated them. From thebeginning, theAmericanmilitary admin-
istration in Germany had tried to identify those Germans that would
be sympathetic to their goals and thinking on and around competition.
They found Eberhard Günther, who had been in charge of monitoring
cartel agreementswithin theMinistry ofEconomicsduring theWeimar
Republic. They also came to work with a number of ‘ordo-liberal’ eco-
nomists, like Franz Böhm or Alfred Müller-Armack. The ‘Freiburg
school’, with which those men were associated, had formulated in the
1930s an economic programme that was then highly heterodox in the
German context. Ordo-liberals believed that competition, if nurtured
and protected by a tight legal framework, was a basic precondition of
political democracy. Early on, Americans had also identiﬁed Ludwig
Erhard, at the time a relatively unknown professor of economics who
had been in close contact with the Freiburg school for a number of
years, as a potential local relay. In 1948, the Americans appointed
Erhard chairman of the newly constituted German Economic Council
(Deutscher Wirtschaftsrat).
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As Economic Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany from
1949 onwards, he became a central ﬁgure in mediating between the
demands of the American military government in Germany on one
side and German resistance and opposition on the other. Erhard
himself favoured a law that would combine strict opposition to cartels
with a much more lenient approach to concentrations of economic
power (Djelic 1998: 109–10). This, in fact, placed him close to the
Americanantitrust traditionand to thepositionat the timeofAmerican
occupation authorities.1 His vision of a social market economy (soziale
Marktwirtschaft) relied on a combination of large-scale ﬁrms and efﬁ-
cient competition that together would drive the German economy
towards US-type consumer capitalism (Berghahn 1985: 185; Erhard
1958: 169–71).
During the early period of the drafting process, between 1949 and
1953, Erhard could count on the support of the Christian Democratic
Party. He could also rely on representatives of the Liberal Party and, of
course, he could turn if needed to theAlliedHighCommission.Within
German industry, the retail trade sector and parts of the small and
medium-sized business community—those represented in particular
in the Association of Entrepreneurs (Arbeitsgemeinschaft selbständiger
Unternehmer, AsU)—were in principle supportive of a ban on cartels.
These actors hoped that such a ban could protect them against pres-
sures from big business (Berghahn 1986). Nevertheless, even within
those groups, the legitimacy of cartels was still deeply entrenched and
it was acknowledged that there were necessary, or at least acceptable,
exemptions (Hüttenberger 1976: 294; Robert 1976: 175).
Overall, though, support in Germany for Erhard’s position was
small and marginal. The majority of German business leaders were
ﬁercely opposed to a ban on cartels (Hüttenberger 1976: 294; Robert
1976: 375–81). In spite of the 1947 Allied laws, there was informal
coordination of market behaviour after the war that was quite remin-
iscent of inter-war cartelization. This was particularly so in those
industrieswhere pre-war cartels had been strong—rawmaterials, pro-
duction, and investment goods industries. Opposition against any
kind of cartel legislation was most likely to be found in these sectors
(Voigt 1962: 188). But the opinion that cartels were necessary and
1 This was the reason why a ﬁrst German draft, written by a team of ordo-liberal experts and
presented in 1949 to Erhard, was quickly ﬁled away. This so-called ‘Josten draft’ was not only
criticized by German business leaders whowere against a strict prohibition of cartels. It was also
in fact rejected by Erhard and theAmericans on the grounds that it called for strong political and
legal intervention in order to prevent concentrations of economic power (Robert 1976: 112–3).
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legitimate ways to coordinate market strategies of ﬁrms was popu-
lar and widespread, well beyond those industries. Before the war,
small and medium-sized ﬁrms in many industries, including mech-
anical engineering and consumer goods, had found protection behind
cartel agreements. Price, term-ﬁxing, and specialization agreements
allowed weaker players to survive, protecting them in fact from the
efﬁciency andproductivity of larger ﬁrms.After thewar, some of those
smaller ﬁrms feared that a general prohibition of cartels would mean
the end of such protection and trigger a process of concentration that
would make it difﬁcult for them to survive (Herrigel 1996: 172).
As soon as industry associations became re-established in the late
1940s and early 1950s they began to lobby ﬁercely. In particular, the
Federal Association of German Industries (Bundesverband Deutscher
Industrien, BDI) under the leadership of Fritz Berg became a vocal
opponent of Erhard’s project. The BDI argued that time was not yet
ripe for a German economy fully based on the competition principle
and that a prohibition of cartels would hamper economic reconstruc-
tion. Instead, the BDI favoured a legislation modelled on the double
principle of abuse control and self-government by industry, as known
from the Weimar Republic (Braunthal 1965; Damm 1958; Djelic 1998).
On a more pragmatic level, the BDI and its sectoral member associ-
ations lobbied throughout the drafting process for exemptions and
exceptions. Industry associations exerted constant pressure through
direct contacts with speciﬁc ministries (i.e. ﬁnance or transport). They
also lobbied elected representatives of the Parliament (Bundestag) and
members of the upper house (Bundesrat). They pushed the idea that
export, crises, rationalization, or specialization cartels were necessary
and suggested that certain sectors should be fully exempted (Robert
1976: 181–5).2 After long debates, the Economic Ministry ﬁnally sub-
mitted draft legislation to Parliament in 1952. The massive opposition
stemming from business communities, however, and their active lob-
bying, meant that discussions of the bill were still pending at the time
of the elections in October 1953.
Following the elections, a new attempt was made to reach an agree-
ment. Ludwig Erhard created an ad hoc commission that brought
together ofﬁcials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and a few
2 In the pursuit of their aims, members of this camp did not hesitate to use rather crude
methods of lobbying. For example, they threatened to reduce their campaign contributions for
the 1953 elections and launched a virulent media campaign against Erhard, whom they accused
of acting on American orders (Erhard 1963: Chapter 16).
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members of the BDI. At the same time he attempted to tighten
the links with those groups of industry (particularly the AsU and
parts of the consumer goods industry) that did not beneﬁt so much
from cartels and were therefore more willing to accept a prohibi-
tion. Representatives of these groups became increasingly vocal from
1954 onwards, challenging the dominant position of the BDI and
its leader Fritz Berg (Berghahn 1986; Braunthal 1965). In 1954, for
example, a group of business leaders representing companies such
as the Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, Württembergische Metallwaren-
fabrik, Krupp, Klöckner, or Mannesmann, sent an open letter to the
EconomicMinister where they argued that a prohibition of cartels was
not necessarily negative for the German economy and that the BDI
was far from representing the opinion of all its members (Robert 1976:
251–2).
The ad hoc commission ﬁnally agreed on a revised version in 1955.
Erhard had insisted on the prohibition principle—the revised bill
included a prohibition of cartels largely similar to the provisions of the
ShermanAct—but had accepted anumber of exceptions to the prohibi-
tion clause. Most of those exceptions had been proposed by industry
representatives already during the ﬁrst legislation period. The bill was
presented to the Bundestag in 1955. Hostilities between the opposing
camps were immediately reopened. Pressure now came not only from
industry, but also from other ministries and politicians, in particular
from some members of the Christian Democratic Party (Robert 1976:
371). With the end of the occupation regime in 1954, the threat of dir-
ect imposition of a law by theAmericans was not so credible anymore.
This allowed the opponents of a clear prohibition principle to exert
more inﬂuence in the drafting process than before. Furthermore, in the
course of the early 1950s, mergers between large companies brought
the retail sector aswell as small andmedium-sized companies increas-
ingly into opposition to a strict prohibition of cartels because they felt
such legislation would be directed exclusively against them. In con-
sequence, Erhard lost the support of a strong group that in the early
1950s had been an important ally (Hüttenberger 1976: 107). Hence, he
had to accept a few more changes before the Law against Restraints
on Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) was
ﬁnally passed in 1957.3
3 The German Law against Restraints on Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrän-
kungen) is cited in the following in the version of 27 July 1957, as reprinted in Lehnich (1958:
89–127).
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6.2.3. GWB: Magna Carta for change or
a text hiding continuity?
At the end of the seven year-long ﬁght for a German antitrust
act, the result appeared at ﬁrst sight signiﬁcant. The Law against
Restraints on Competition (abbreviated in German to GWB (Gesetz
gegen wettbewerbsbeschrängkungen)) represented, at least formally,
a clear departure for the German product markets from the legacy of
economic coordination through cartelization. Cartel agreements with
restrictive effects on competitionwere declared null andvoid (S. 1) and
a newly created Federal Cartel Ofﬁce (Bundeskartellamt) was in charge
ofmonitoring obedience and pursuing offences and behaviours illegal
under the GWB frame (S. 48).
The law, however, included a number of exceptions. These
were essentially of two types. First, certain types of agreements
were excluded from thegeneral ban (SS. 2 – 7GWB).Among thesewere
term-ﬁxing, rebate, and specialization agreements that had merely to
benotiﬁed to theFederalCartelOfﬁce. This typeof exceptions reﬂected
a compromise with the small andmedium-sized business community.
Structural crisis cartels and export cartels were also exempted from
the general ban. The latter not only had to be notiﬁed, though, they
also had to be approved by the Federal Cartel Ofﬁce. Furthermore,
the law gave the Economics Ministry full authority to allow cartels in
exceptional circumstances, when thenational interest orpublicwelfare
called for limits to competition (S. 8, section1GWB). Second, industries
in which full market competition was not considered as appropriate
or possible, were excluded entirely from the area in which the lawwas
operative. This included the public sector (S. 98 GWB), transport and
communication (S. 99), agriculture and forestry (S. 100), the banking
and insurance sector (S. 102) and utilities (S. 103) (Voigt 1962: 191).
Although GWB created a space for exceptions, the general pro-
hibition of price and quota cartels, as well as the establishment of a
federal agency in charge of monitoring and, if necessary, sanctioning
violations of the law, did affect the business behaviour of German
companies—even though with considerable delay in many cases. It
prevented, in particular, the re-emergence of thousands of cartels that
had structured the economy during the inter-war period (Nawrocki
1973: 105). The overall number of cartel agreements, as registeredwith
the FederalCartelOfﬁce, remained lowduring the followingdecades.4
4 During the period 1958–60 the Federal Cartel Ofﬁce received 189 applications for cartel
agreements (Voigt 1962: 195). In 1972, 212 cartel agreements were registered with the Federal
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According to contemporary observers—even those who were rather
critical of the exemptions associated with the law—during the ﬁrst
years of its existence the German legislation led to more fairness
in competition and freedom in decision-making in many industries.
The investment and expansion strategies of most companies were no
longer driven by the ‘cartel rhythm’ that had been so characteristic of
inter-war Germany (Voigt 1962: 204).
At the same time, theGerman lawcouldnotprevent companies from
searching for ways to bypass it. This was made easy in fact by the for-
mulation of Section 1 that left informal cartel agreements and collusive
behaviour outside the reach of the Federal Cartel Ofﬁce. Neither was
the law prepared to deal adequately with issues of misuse or abuse
of economic power. Those issues arose in the late 1950s, together with
increasing economic concentration (Nawrocki 1973; Voigt 1962).5 Dur-
ing the 1960s, the Federal Cartel Ofﬁce used information and persua-
sion to try and inﬂuence business attitudes. This wasmet with consid-
erable reservation. In the early 1970s, cartel-friendly attitudeswere still
not exceptional within the German business community. This led the
FederalCartelOfﬁce in the 1970s toﬁneheavily anumberof companies
that had been shown to have violated the GWB (Nawrocki 1973: 103).
The impact of the GWB on company strategy and behaviour was
therefore often not direct or immediate. Rather, it followedupon a long
processof confrontationandcontestationbetweendifferent actorswith
opposing interests. Throughout this process, it was not always clear,
who would have the upper hand. At critical points, the champions
of cartel prohibition and in particular the Federal Cartel Ofﬁce, were
bolstered and helped by the development, in parallel, of a European
competition regime. In some cases, the Federal Cartel Ofﬁce even
sought the active support of European competition institutions (Quack
and Djelic 2005). The overall outcome of this more long-term process
of normative and cognitive transformation was that cartel-like beha-
viour gradually and increasingly became regarded as inadequate and
illegitimate by politicians, lawyers, and business leaders in Germany.
The slow move away from a legacy of cartelization in German
product markets can be construed as a systematic break with the
past. Whereas in the inter-war period product markets in Germany
Cartel Ofﬁce in Germany the majority of which were export, term-ﬁxing and specialization
cartels (Nawrocki 1973: 119).
5 The 1973 reform of the GWB dealt with those weaknesses. It extended the prohibition of
cartels to collusive behaviour, improved the control ofmisuse of economic power and introduced
a systematic control of mergers (Nawrocki 1973 : 111–2).
148
were predominantly governed by cartelization, the post-war period
saw a signiﬁcant move to a liberal market order in this area. Col-
lusion between actual or potential competitors became not only
prohibited by law but also increasingly regarded by a growing num-
ber of economic and societal actors as an inappropriate strategy to
achieve a leading position in national and international markets.
Among business leaders this reorientation was not only facilitated
by a younger generation of managers taking over responsibility in
the 1960s and 1970s (Berghahn 1986) but also by the strong impact of
American management methods on German enterprise management
(Djelic 1998).
Change, though, did not preclude continuities and the persistence
of inter-ﬁrm coordination through other means in post-war Germany.
One partial bridge with the past can be found in the growth of large
German combines in the 1960s and 1970s, at this point often in the
form of legally merged entities. Another element of partial continuity,
at least up until the 1990s, was the stabilization, or even expansion,
of the German company network linking German ﬁrms with ﬁnancial
institutions (Beyer 1998; Streeck and Höpner 2003; Windolf and Beyer
1995; Windolf and Schief 1999).
It would be misleading, however, to regard the evolution of the
post-war company network in Germany as a modern substitute for
the industrial cartels of the inter-war period (see also Shonﬁeld 1977
[1965]: 254). Whereas cartels were directed at limiting the exposure of
member ﬁrms to product market competition, the German company
network can be seen as directed towards improving the competit-
iveness of its individual member ﬁrms in liberal (and increasingly
internationalizing) product markets. It did so in a double sense: on
the one hand, by providing ﬂows of information on investment, tech-
nological development and market strategies it created opportunities
for indirect coordination between ﬁrms of the same or related indus-
tries in Germany (Windolf and Beyer 1995: 24)—even though only
rarely between direct competitors (Schönwitz and Weber 1982: 102).
On the other hand, large blocs of cross-shareholding protected its
member ﬁrms—at least well into the 1990s—from hostile takeovers
and short-term capital market pressures (Höpner and Krempel 2003).
Hence, in our view, it is not sufﬁcient to point to the continuities in
structural ﬁnancial and personal inter-ﬁrm linkages. Instead a quali-
tative analysis of which actors attempted to regulate which kinds of
competition with what kinds of results during distinct periods would
be necessary. Höpner and Krempel (2003) show that the motivations
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and logics behind apparent continuities in inter-ﬁrm linkages have
changed considerably over the last century. Their results indicate
that links between companies, like other institutions, can be used as
tools for different objectives and can mean different things in differ-
ent periods. In particular, the conditions of emergence of those links
may have little to do with their contemporary functionalities. The
idea here is that behind stable labels and formal façade, institutional
arrangements may be drifting progressively, changing quite signiﬁc-
antly through time both in meaning and impact (Streeck and Thelen
2005: 36).
Altogether, a progressive but clear break in the dominant order
of product markets—away from cartelization and towards liberali-
zation and competition—has combined in the post-war period in
German product markets with continued and reinvented forms of
social coordination (thiswas the case also in labourmarkets, see Sorge,
Chapter 5, this volume). Ironically, this unique combination can be
seen as highly structuring of what was identiﬁed in the 1970s as a
speciﬁc German model of production. In this respect, the Law against
Restraints on Competition fostered an early move of German ﬁrms
towards modernized forms of inter-ﬁrm coordination in liberalized
product markets which in other European countries did not take place
before the 1990s (Lilja and Moen 2003: 158).
6.3. The Post-War Reorganization of the Competition
Regime in the Banking Sector
Comparing the story of the German competition regime in product
markets with what happened in the banking sector during the same
period reveals both similarities and differences. In both cases, the ini-
tial impulse was exogenous—the initiative for change came from the
Allied occupation government. In both cases, it is difﬁcult to identify
a moment or an event that could represent the type of critical juncture
so important in path dependency arguments. Struggles and confronta-
tions evolved over a period of nearly ten years and what appeared at
one point in time as being a step in the direction of change could
lead only a short time afterwards to severe backlash—and vice versa.
In spite of similarities, however, outcomes in the longer run emerge as
quite distinct.
In the case of product markets, the crooked path ultimately led to
a signiﬁcant transformation of formal institutions, that itself triggered
150
and was reinforced by a progressive reorientation of economic actors
away fromcartelizationand towardsoligopolistic specialization. In the
banking sector, on the other hand, quite drastic formal changes, origin-
ally introduced by the Allied occupation government, did not prove
stable and were progressively displaced. The strength and coherence
of German opposition combined with an evolving geopolitical con-
text and a highly constrained and constraining local ﬁnancial system
to deﬂect and tame changes. Core actors of the German banking sector
managed to defend and maintain cartelization in the ﬁnancial sector
well after the 1958 law prohibited cartelization in most industries and
product markets.
6.3.1. The allied banking project for
Germany—a bone of contention
The role and behaviour of German banks during theNazi periodwas a
sensitive issue after the Second World War—on a par with cartels and
industrial concentration. The American government and its military
administration in Germanywanted to severely punish German banks.
They were also highly critical of the structure of the German banking
system. Growing unrest, rumours about a currency reform and ques-
tions about the viability of the credit system made a reform of the
banking system an urgent issue. When Joseph Dodge, an American
banker, was put in charge of ﬁnancial and banking policy within the
American military government (OMGUS) in September 1945, it was
high up on his agenda. Dodge favoured a far-reaching restructuring
and decentralization of the German banking sector. OMGUS’s pro-
gramme for a ‘democratic and demilitarized banking system’ aimed
at the introduction of more competition in the German banking sector
throughdissolution of the largeprivate banks, the separation of invest-
ment from credit banking and a limitation of interlocking directorates
between banks and industrial combines. Dodge viewed these meas-
ures as ‘an integral part of our program to ensure that the German
ﬁnancial hierarchy will never play any part in disturbing the peace of
the world’ (cited in Horstmann 1991: 64). A novel banking structure
should be established that was, here again, to be modelled upon the
American experience (Holtfrerich 1995: 461).
The Dodge plan met considerable opposition in the Allied Control
Council—the supreme allied authority body. The British military gov-
ernment was highly sceptical of a decentralization of the German
banking system. It would not agree to any such measure as long as
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there was no mechanism set up allowing for a redistribution of ﬁnan-
cial ﬂows between the different military zones. The Soviet military
government opposed theAmerican plans on the grounds that the cur-
rency reform should come before a reform of the banking system. In
October 1946, the chairman of the Allied Control Council acknow-
ledged that no agreement would be reached. Military governors were
left to proceed as they wished in their respective zones of occupation
(Holtfrerich 1995: 469; Horstmann 1991: 93).
Within the American zone, OMGUS sought German supporters of
the Dodge plan. With very few exceptions, reactions among members
of the Länder governmentswere quite negative.6 Ludwig Erhard, then
Economics Minister in the Land of Bavaria, rejected the Dodge plan
uncompromisingly. The arguments advanced by German politicians
were generally in line with the contents of a memorandum that had
been prepared by representatives of the large German private banks.
This memorandum had reached the Southern Länder governments
already in October 1946—a sign that large German banks had early
on begun to lobby German politicians with a view to prevent changes
in the German banking system (Holtfrerich 1995: 472). The claim was
that the German uniﬁed and universal banking system corresponded
to the structure of the overall economy and therefore could not be
dissolved into parts without endangering the stability and liquidity
of that economy as a whole. Furthermore, a functioning system of
banking credit was seen as crucial precondition for the reconstruction
of the German economy (Horstmann 1991: 99).
Still, the threat that OMGUS would impose a law was real. Hence,
governments of the Länder in the American zone prepared draft
legislation for a decentralization of the banking system. In January
1947, central banks were set up in each Land within the American
zone. Representatives of the private banks, however, objected to
any cooperation with the Americans. In reaction, OMGUS issued an
order in March 1946 launching decentralization for the private banks
and making it clear that any informal contact across Land borders
between branches of the same bank was illegal and would be pun-
ished (Horstmann 1991: 105). The governments of the Länder tried to
6 The Land of Baden-Würrtemberg was the only one signalling cautious support of the Dodge
plan. The Finance Minister, Dr Fritz Cahn-Garnier, himself a victim of persecution under the
Nazi regime, and Otto Pﬂeiderer, head of department in the ﬁnance ministry, believed that
decentralization of the banking system was an important dimension of political federalism.
Pﬂeiderer also argued that a banking reform was a necessary ‘complement to the policy of
decartelization’ (cited in Horstmann 1991: 107).
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convince private banks to collaborate with OMGUS. Those attempts,
however, were unsuccessful. In May 1947, theAmerican military gov-
ernment came up with one more piece of legislation. Law no. 57
appointed state commissioners in charge of decentralization for each
of the large private banks.
From 1947 onwards, Western occupying powers started talking
about the possibility of having a bi- or trizonal central bank. TheBritish
military government was particularly convinced that this would be
a mechanism facilitating the redistribution of ﬁnancial ﬂows across
occupation zones. As a concrete result of these discussions, the Bank
of German Counties (Bank Deutscher Länder) and the Allied banking
commission started operating in Frankfurt in February 1948. As a
counterpart, the British (and French) military governments agreed to
a decentralization of private banks at the Land level in their zones
also. Thus, by April 1948, it seemed as if key features of the Dodge
plan were becoming reality in the three Western zones. The Reichs-
bank had been replaced by a federal system of central banks at the
Land level. Out of the three large private German banks, thirty form-
ally independent banks had been created. Both central and private
banks could only operate within the borders of a Land. Apparently,
the decentralization of the German banking sector had been achieved.
The legal liquidation of the old private banks, however, proved difﬁ-
cult to implement because it required the cooperation of all fourAllied
governments. Opposition against a speedy liquidation did not only
come from the Russian military government. There was resistance as
well on the British side, and, of course within the German banking
community.
6.3.2. Reconcentration of the German banking sector
In fact, there was hardly anybody within that community supporting
the American decentralization plan. Top managers in large private
banks had been suspended and often arrested by the Allied gov-
ernments immediately after the war. Regional managers took over
responsibility in the new local and decentralized banks and, in the
American zone, state commissioners appointed by OMGUS had com-
plete power. When they came back from captivity and de-naziﬁcation
camps, however, the old German banking elites re-asserted their
leadership. Soon, links and cooperation between banks across Land
borders were re-established on an informal (and illegal) basis. At
Deutsche Bank, for example, members of the pre-1945 board of
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directors started to meet again informally from 1947, sending out
instructions on important issues to all decentralizedunits. Oneof those
board members, Hermann J. Abs, had been in close contact since 1946
with the British military government. He became subsequently a key
ﬁgure in the mobilization of private banks against a decentralization
of the German banking sector (Holtfrerich 1995: 481–2).
At Dresdner Bank, the ‘old circle’ met regularly from mid-1948
onwards and secretmessengerswere circulatingwith information and
money between the different Länder and military zones (Horstmann
1991: 178–9). Management through informal channels was made pos-
sible by the loyalty of regional managers to their previous ‘mother
bank’. Similarly, a number of the state commissioners appointed by the
Americanmilitarygovernmenthadpreviously been active in thebank-
ing sector and sympathized openly or silently with a recentralization
of private banks. Politicians as well as public opinion at the time were
fully in agreement with the banking community. The decentraliza-
tion of the banking sector was unpopular almost everywhere. Unlike
in the competition ﬁeld, where the ordo-liberals played a signiﬁcant
role, the Americans were unable to ﬁnd supporters for their banking
policy.
In 1950, the year when the Federal Republic of Germany was
founded, Hermann J. Abs and Wilhelm Vocke, the president of the
directorate of the Bank Deutscher Länder, presented their own propos-
itions for the future of the German banking sector. A massive press
campaign supported this German plan that opposed the American
program and had the backing of German politicians, independent
of party afﬁliation. A ﬁrst victory for this German opposition came
soon. The British military government sent a special memorandum
to the ﬁnancial committee of the Allied High Commission. This
memorandum integrated in modiﬁed form the proposal of Hermann
J. Abs for a revival of the large private German banks (Horstmann
1991: 211).
This led to heated controversies between the three Western powers
that proved impossible to reconcile. As a result, Allied ﬁnancial con-
sultants formally called upon the German Minister of Finance, in
March 1950, to develop a plan for the restructuring of the banking
sector. In contrast to the equally unresolved reordering of the iron and
steel industry, or of I. G. Farben, the initiative for future planning in the
banking sector was handed over to the German side. This opportunity
was quickly taken up by German bankers and politicians. In March
1952, a German law came into force that allowed a recombination
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of banking activities into three independent banks covering larger
areas of the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany.7 During
parliamentary debates, members of the social-democratic and lib-
eral parties argued for a full reconcentration of the banking sector.
This was considered, however, politically unrealistic by the German
government (Horstmann 1991: 281).
Of course, debates in Parliament did not go unnoticed amongst
Allied representatives in Germany. When the draft legislation was
submitted for approval in March 1952, the Allied High Commis-
sion formally demanded a reassurance that the three-banks model
would not be immediately questioned itself. The government of the
Federal Republic of Germany issued a secrete declaration of obligation
(Verpﬂichtungserklärung). On 27 March 1952, in a letter to the Allied
High Commission, Konrad Adenauer declared that the three-banks
model would remain stable for the three years following enactment
of the law. Geographical extension, in particular, of the domain of
each bank was ruled out. Furthermore, the Finance Minister issued
a declaration promising a reform of the right of banks to represent
minority shareholders for whom they hold the shares (Horstmann
1991: 283).
Representatives from the private banks, however, were only wait-
ing for the next opportunity to recombine further and to turn their
three large banks into a single bank uniﬁed at the Federal level. When
the Federal Republic of Germany regained full sovereignty in May
1955, this was immediately followed by calls from the private banks
to remove the banking law. The drafting process for a new legislation
started early in 1956, inﬂuenced by the suggestions of the German
private banks. The law was passed rapidly without debates and with
unanimous voting by the German parliament on 12 December 1956.
It allowed for a recombination along the lines of the former banking
groups starting in January 1957—the ﬁrst possible date according to
Adenauer’s secrete declaration (Horstmann 1991: 294).
When compared to the originalAmerican plans for a reorganization
of the German banking sector, the outcomes of the actual reform pro-
cess appeared quite limited at the end of the 1950s. Instead, one ﬁnds
signiﬁcant evidence of continuity with respect to the structure and
functioningof theGermanbanking systemacross andbeyond theNazi
period and the Second World War. The early American proposition to
separate credit and investment banking had altogether disappeared
7 Gesetz über den Niederlassungsbereich von Kreditinstitutionen, Großbankengesetz.
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from the agenda. The same thing could be said of the plan to reduce
and limit industrial shareholdings by German banks. Since the 1952
law, it was apparently accepted that the managers of large banks were
the ones to be in charge of a reordering of the banking sector. This
meant, in fact, that those who were making the decisions and plan-
ning ‘reform’ were the very men who had been ruling the industry
before and during the SecondWorldWar. The 1956 legislation, ﬁnally,
meant the full re-establishment of universal large private banking in
Germany—nearly at the same time as the long-lasting struggle for a
competition law came to an end with a signiﬁcant impact there on
formal rules of the game.
One important factor that could explain in part the failure of the
ambitious American plan was the absence of liquid and large-scale
stock markets. Banks were the only external providers of capital in
post-war Germany. In that context, attempts to split banks into small
units with little ﬁnancial power and to detach them from their tra-
ditional ownership and personal links to industry were bound to be
unpopular and to generate resistance. All the more so that, after 1948,
the reconstruction of the German economy called for a joint mobiliz-
ation of economic and ﬁnancial resources. And this joint mobilization
was in fact being encouraged by the United States for geopolitical
reasons.
6.3.3. Cooperation and competition in the
German banking sector
Overall, continuity deﬁnes the German banking sector in the period
after the Second World War. Since the ﬁnancial crisis of the 1930s, the
German banking sector had been governed by cartel agreements that
included recommendations on interest rates. Soon after the Second
WorldWar, banks and banking associations pleaded for a continuation
of these sector-speciﬁc restrictions on competition. Their main argu-
ment was that free competition in the banking sector would quickly
undermine the stability and security of the overall ﬁnancial system.
The authorities in charge of bank supervision in the different Länder
generally accepted this argument and declared cartel agreements in
that sector valid in principle (Hausleutner 1970: 47–8, 86–7).
The planned Law against Restraints on Competition loomed as a
serious challenge to the existing coordination of interest rates and
more generally to restrictions on competitionwithin theGermanbank-
ing sector. Unsurprisingly, banks and banking associations became
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involved in the debate around the GWB from the start. They lobbied
to have the ﬁnancial sector exempted from the law.With the support of
ﬁnancial supervisory authorities, and of several Länder governments,
they managed to obtain the insertion of a sectoral exception into the
law against restraints on competition (GWB, see p. 146) (Hüttenberger
1976: 306; Robert 1976: 185, 341; Schmidt 1995: 22). As a consequence,
banks and banking associations could ofﬁcially continue their practice
of negotiated and coordinated interest rates. In 1967, the Federal gov-
ernment declared the existing interest rate decree as invalid in order
to generate more competition in the banking sector—with little effect.
Several banking associations argued that individual banks needed
help and orientation (Orientierungshilfe) during the transition period
that would lead to more competition. Hence, they went on propos-
ing and registering recommendations on credit interest rates with the
Federal Cartel Ofﬁce (Hausleutner 1970: 111–2).
The exemption of the banking (and insurance) sector from the Law
against Restraints on Competition (GWB) would be removed only in
1990. Three developments preceded and prepared the 1990 reform
of §102 GWB. From the mid-1970s, the Federal Cartel Ofﬁce (FCO)
had systematically gone after collusive behaviour. Increasingly, it was
takingamuchmore critical positionon the issueof interest rates recom-
mendations in the banking sector (Schmidt 1995: 77). Then, during the
1980s, the FCO received support from the EC’s Directorate General IV,
which launched an increasing number of investigations into cases
of anti-competitive behaviour in the European ﬁnancial sector. The
EuropeanCourt of Justice also helped by conﬁrming that the European
competition law was applicable without sectoral exemption in all
those cases.
The European layer of competition law began to penetratemore and
more national administrative and legal decision-making and ﬁnally
constrained the relevant German actors to adapt national legislation
to European standards (Quack and Djelic 2005; Schmidt 1995: 26).
Furthermore, since the mid-1980s large private banks in Germany
were going through strategic reorientation from national to interna-
tional (often European) markets and from universal to investment
banking (Morgan andQuack 1999; Vitols 2001). Liberalizationof ﬁnan-
cial markets as well as increasing international competition between
8 Aspecial law concernedwith the regulation of the banking sector (Kreditwesengesetz (KWG)),
was enacted in July 1961. It indicated the conditions under which banks would be allowed to
operate but did not touch upon questions of competition in this sector (Hausleutner 1970: 137 ff.).
157
banks undermined the collective capabilities of large private banks
with respect to sectoral self-organization and market coordination
(Höpner and Krempel 2003; Lütz 2002; Deeg and Lane, Chapters 2
and 4, respectively, this volume).
6.4. How Institutions Change: Rethinking the Idea of Path
The two storieswehavedescribed and contrasted in this chapter give a
sense of how processes of institutional change can be complex, dense,
and somewhat messy in real life. We have looked in this chapter at an
important institutional subsystem—the competition regime—and at
its fate in two parts of theGerman economy—productmarkets and the
banking sector.Acomparisonof evolutions in those two cases provides
us with an illustration of the conditions and limits for institutional
change.We nowpull together themain theoretical claimswe canmake
on the basis of the empirical material provided in this chapter.
6.4.1. A pincer movement
In the stories we told above, a critical factor inﬂuencing the shift in
competition regime in German product markets was the signiﬁcant
pressure brought to bear by the United States, and the alternative
model this country provided.Additionally, though, for this shift to sta-
bilize, itwas crucial that itwas supported by a local groupwhobecame
committed to the American ideas in order to gain leverage for their
own, preexisting, German intellectual tradition. The ordo-liberals had
been marginal in Germany—both intellectually and institutionally—
until the end of the Second World War. But they were German seeds
upon which the American antitrust pressure could be grafted. The
support of American occupation authorities brought a number of
ordo-liberals into key institutional positions from which they could
inﬂuence the political and, later on, the business communities. Over
time they were also able to engage in public discussions over the pros
and cons of an economic constitution for the newly founded Federal
Republic of Germany, linking the choice of a new competition regime
with general political issues of democracy and social justice. Hence,
the reordering of product markets in post-war Germany started from
the collaboration between dominant foreign and peripheral domestic
actors. Once local actors had obtained access to important positions of
power andwere able to champion their project to broadparts of society,
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dynamics internal to Germany gained momentum and proved quite
signiﬁcant for the long-term stabilization of change.
We argue that change is more likely when institutional systems
or subsystems are being attacked from both inside and outside,
and foreign as well as domestic actors are able to mobilize vari-
ous resources in favour of a common project (for more examples of
that see Djelic 1998; Djelic and Quack 2003). The case of the bank-
ing sector in Germany is in part a counterfactual illustration of our
claim. The Dodge plan did not have the expected impact, nor were
its consequences long lasting, partly because it lacked the support of
signiﬁcant domestic actors. The small number of groups willing to
link the decentralization of banks to broader debates on economic
democracy and Federalism (such as a few political representatives
in Baden-Württemberg) were not able to mobilize any signiﬁcant
support.
The case of the banking sector, however, points also to structural
limitations creating signiﬁcant constraints for actors with the desire
to mobilize in the direction of the envisioned project. The under-
development of stock markets in Germany meant that both American
occupation authorities, as well as the very few domestic proponents
of a decentralization of the banking sector, had difﬁculties in pointing
to a viable alternative to universal banks—particularly in a situation
in which ﬁnancing was urgently needed for the economic reconstruc-
tion and ﬁnancial markets were still predominantly national. Such
structural limitations gave on the other hand the old banking elites
signiﬁcant leverage and the capacity to mobilize in their own interest.
6.4.2. Layered dimensions of institutionalization
The contrast of these processes of change in German product markets
and banking sector highlights the multiple ways in which institution-
alization occurs.Whenwe thinkof institutions as collective, stabilizing
or stabilized, rules of the game, we need to consider of at least three
dimensions. First, we have to consider the formal institutions or rules
of the game, whether they be structurally embedded or codiﬁed in
‘hard’ or ‘soft’ law regimes. Second, our empirical material also tells
us, that we should pay attention to individual and collective beha-
viours and interactions that set themselves in a relation of coevolution
with formal institutions. Finally, we have to take into consideration
contextual rationalities (Djelic and Durand 2004), the background
logics or principles in which institutional systems or rules of the game
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are inscribed. There can be more, or less, ﬁt between those three levels
ordimensions.Atight ﬁt andarticulationbetweenall threedimensions
reveals a strong and stable institutional regime—at least at themoment
of observation. On the other hand, decoupling or loose ﬁt reveal, we
suggest, pressures for and greater potentiality of institutional change
and recomposition.
Challenges to and attacks upon institutional regimes can happen at
all three levels in succession or concomitantly. The story of the reorder-
ing of productmarkets inGermany shows that quite clearly. One could
argue that the process started with a formal rewriting of the lawwhen
the occupying powers issued a decree in 1947 prohibiting cartels, com-
bines, syndicates, or trusts. At the same time, and for ten years after
that, we document a process of loose coevolution. The local German
champions of the antitrustmovementwere busy elaborating their own
version of the formal law—but the impact of that process on the beha-
viour of economic actors was at best indirect and in any case delayed.
Behaviourswere, in themeantime, changingwithin certaingroupsand
the overall balance of powerwithin the German economywas shifting
in favour of those groups that had either internalized market regula-
tion (throughhierarchies) or developedpatterns of regulation alternat-
ive to cartels. Those changes in logics of actionwere only partly related
to changes in formal rules of the game. Furthermore, the direction of
causalities was not so clear and changes in behaviours and market
interactions inﬂuenced the process of transformation of formal insti-
tutions, at least as much as the latter had an impact on logics of action.
In the end, though, where we start from probably matters less
than the fact that, in time, changes aggregate and combine on
all three dimensions. Consequential and long-lasting institutional sys-
tem change calls for a transformation of formal rules, behaviours and
underlying principles. This is bound, however, to be step by step and
to require time. It is likely to involve and reﬂect amultiplicity of cumu-
lative pressures exerting themselves frommany angles on a particular
institutional regime.
6.4.3. Nestedness and reinforcing pressures
The importance of nested and reinforcing pressures at other levels of
collective action is a further conclusion to be drawn from this compar-
ison. In parallel to the reordering of markets in Germany, an antitrust
regime was being developed at the European level. Antitrust provi-
sions emerged as an important feature of both the European Coal and
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Steel Community (ECSC) as it was being structured, starting in 1951,
and the European Economic Community (EEC), which was born with
theTreatyofRome in1957 (Djelic 2002; QuackandDjelic 2005). The two
processes—oneof institutional change at thenational level inGermany
and one of institution building at the European level—had originally
emerged andwere initiated independently from each other. Those two
processes, however, soon collided, colluded, fed, and reinforced each
other.
This concomitant and partly interconnected development of anti-
trust at the European level has, over the long run, been a stabilizing
factor for the shift in competition regime in German product markets.
A comparison with the post-war story of competition regime shift
in Japan would tend to conﬁrm that (Haley 2001). Although the
Japanese story sharedmany featureswith theGermanone (Streeck and
Yamamura 2003), the resulting institutional transformation in Japan
was neither as signiﬁcant nor as stable in the long run as it has been
in Germany. One of the explanations, we propose, is that the shift
in competition regime in German product markets was stabilized and
reinforced through timeby thedevelopment andemergence of another
‘layer’, as it were, of antitrust, at the transnational or European level.
Such reinforcing pressure was entirely absent on the other hand in the
Japanese story.
The story of the banking sector inGermany provides uswith further
evidence of the role and signiﬁcance of reinforcing and nested pres-
sures. The attempt at introducing more competitive logics within the
Germanbanking sector proved relatively short-lived andunsuccessful
during the 1950s. We argued above that the relative lack of success of
the change project in the German banking sector could be explained in
part by the absence of local champions. The pincers had only one arm.
At the same time, when we extend the banking story to look at more
recent developments (the 1980s and 1990s), it becomes clear that the
German banking sector has been experiencing major transformations
(see also Lane, Chapter 4, this volume) after decades of stability and
relative resistance to change. An important difference for this sector
between then and now has been the emergence of reinforcing and nes-
ted pressures at the European and global level. European regulation
has matured and progressively trickled down towards the German
banking sector while the internationalization of ﬁnancial markets has
provided alternatives to industrial ﬁnance through domestic banks
for many large corporate actors in Germany, and the political elite has
become progressively reconciled to this.
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6.4.4. From path dependence to path generation
This chapter suggests that the shift in competition regime in Germany
since the end of the Second World War has emerged from a succes-
sion of critical junctures, and from a multi-step process of coevolution
and hybridization of new rules of the game and preexisting practices.
The path has been a crooked rather than a straight one and we argue
that it could only be charted and ascertained a posteriori. Many of
the stages and step-by-step evolutions could not have been fully anti-
cipated or expected. We do not document a pattern of punctuated
equilibrium—a single radical and abrupt jump from one competition
regime to another. Nor do we give evidence, though, of evolutionary
and inconsequential within path transformation. When we look at the
period as awhole, the shift in competition regimewas progressive and
step by step and nevertheless highly consequential.
We propose that the idea of ‘path generation’ ﬁts quite nicely with
the process of institutional change we have described here and, more
generally, suggest that the life and evolution of institutions may have
more to do with processes of ‘path generation’ than with patterns of
‘path dependence’. There are a number of key differences between the
two concepts. The idea of ‘path dependence’ implies a focus on the
past. The past constrains or even determines the present or the future.
In contrast, the idea of ‘path generation’ suggests at least as much a
projection towards an open-ended future.
Another major difference concerns the degree of openness implied
byboth terms. In the lessdeterministic variants of thepathdependence
argument, the process is open-ended for a short while only, during the
periods that coincide with critical junctures. But then the process is
closed off, precisely through what happens during those moments.
In our idea of ‘path generation’, on the other hand, the process is
open-ended throughout. Themultiplicity of critical junctures together
with their partly unexpected consequences means that both the path
itself and its consequences can be fully recognized and mapped only
post hoc.
A third important difference between the concepts of path depend-
ence and path generation has to do with the articulation between
structures and agency. Path dependence arguments tend to be asso-
ciated with passive models of action where behavioural patterns and
9 See Garud and Karnoe (2001: 6) for a parallel discussion of path creation and path
dependencies in the ﬁeld of entrepreneurship and technological innovation.
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logics of action are merely constrained by and have to adapt to struc-
tural and institutional frames. Our idea of path generation reveals, on
the other hand, a preoccupation with a process of coevolution and
mutual interplay—where institutional frames constrain behaviours
and agency, the latter in turn shaping, adapting and transforming
the institutional and structural rules of the game in which they are
embedded.
In contrast to the weak model of path dependence (Sewell 1996),
the concept of path generation allows us to specify the conditions
under which redirection of an existing path becomes likely. In our
case study we have identiﬁed two such enabling conditions: a pin-
cer movement of external and internal pressures for change and the
ability of foreign and local actors to mobilize positional, relational,
and discursive resources in favour of a planned change. Unlike in the
strong variant of path dependence, on the other hand, a redirection of
the path comes not from a single critical juncture but rather it emerges
and isbeing constructed throughahistorical sequenceofmultiple junc-
tures that cannot be fully anticipated. The path is a crooked one and
it reﬂects long periods of struggle between countervailing pressures.
This crookedpath shows the historical interplay between pressures for
continuity and stimuli for change—the reinforcing mechanisms iden-
tiﬁed byMahoney (2000) and Pierson (2000) being challenged then by
external and internal triggers for change.
Theperspective on institutional change that emerges has been theor-
ized elsewhere (Djelic and Quack 2003). We argue that the succession
and combination, over a long period of time, of a series of incremental
steps and junctures can lead in the end to consequential and signiﬁc-
ant change. Each single one of these incremental steps may appear in
itself quite marginal and it may be absorbed and mitigated in part by
the preexisting institutional frame. However, the succession, aggreg-
ation, and combination of multiple and multilayered steps ultimately
and with a longer term view of the process adds to the signiﬁcance
and heightens the impact of each single transformation. We use the
image of ‘stalactite change’ (Djelic and Quack 2003: 309) and we see it
asmore useful to describe theway inwhichmost national institutional
systems change than the image of the ‘Big Bang’ often associated with
punctuated equilibria models.
10 See also Thelen (2003: 210) for a discussion of the ‘cumulative effects of ongoing and often
subtle changes’ and Streeck and Thelen (2005) for another thorough analysis of ‘incremental
change with transformative results’.
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